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THE NATIONALISM OF SWIFT V. TYSON*
J. S. WATERMAN**
Had Swift v. Tyson' been decided differently by Judge Joseph
Story legal literature would be considerably less in volume.2 If the
historical importance of the decision can be judged by the controver-
sies over it, other explanations of it can perhaps be condoned.
John Chipman Gray explained the decision by an analysis of Judge
Story's character and position. Judge Story's fondness for glitter-
ing generalities, his restless vanity, his place as the oldest judge on
the bench, and his preparation of a work on bills of exchange, Mr.
Gray said, conspired to produce the doctrine designated by the name
of "Swift v. Tyson."3 Such an explanation, if written today, would
perhaps be quite in accord with modern biographies of a psycho-
analytical nature.
But Thomas Jefferson, had he lived till 1842, might have said
that one could not have expected more from a "pseudo-Republican"
4
or a product of Massachusetts jurisprudence-that queer mixture of
Mosaic principles, of a little dash of common law, and a lot of orig-
inal notions of their own-which had never produced a first-rate
common law lawyer. 5 And any good Virginia "Republican" leader
could have said of the decision that it was but another phase of the
judicial nationalism begun by Marshall.
6
II
The history of the appointment of Story to the bench and his polit-
ical views may throw some light on the decision. When President
Madison in 1811 appointed Joseph Story of Massachusetts to the
Supreme Court of the United States, 7 the Federalists in New Eng-
* Research Paper No. 276, Journal Series, University of Arkansas.
** Professor of Law and Dean of the School of Law, University of Ar-
kansas.
'16 Pet. 1, 10 L. ed. 865 (1842).
For a list of articles on Swift v. Tyson see: FRANKFURTER AND KATZ,
CASES OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE (1931) 159; MEDINA, CASES
ON FEDERAL PROCEDURE (1926) 82.
GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (2d ed. 1924) 253.
'11 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (Ford ed. 1904) 143, a letter of
1810.
'Id. at 151, 154, a letter of 1810.
84 BEVERIDGE, MARSHALL (1919) c. 6.
73 LEWIS, GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS (1908) 137; WARREN, A HISTORY
OF THE AMERICAN BAR (1911) 272; 1 WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN
UNITED STATES HISTORY (1923) 400-426.
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land viewed the act with their accustomed alarm over the stability
of the young nation.8 Of the appointment it was said:
"I remember my father's graphic account of the rage of the Fed-
eralists when 'Joe Story, that country pettifogger, aged thirty-two,'
was made a judge of our highest court. He was a bitter Democrat
in those days, and had written a Fourth of July oration which was
a red flag to the Federal bull." 9
Jefferson, who was personally interested in the appointment of a
successor to Justice Cushing of Massachusetts, because of the legal
controversy with Livingston1 0 over the batture in New Orleans,
thought that Story was a "tory," the worst he could say of any
man; too young no doubt, to resist Marshall; and of questionable
political faith, despite his alleged "Republicanism.""' Story in turn
thought none too highly of the Virginia visionary,' 2 whose embargo
legislation of 1807 had almost ruined maritime New England.' 3
Jefferson at one time desired the appointment of Judge John
Tyler of Virginia to the Supreme Bench, as Cushing's successor,
whose "soul never quailed" and who could measure "his powers by
the side of Chief Justice Marshall.' 4 At any rate, Tyler would be
no "milk-and-water associate" who could not maintain an independ-
ence of judgment against Marshall.'3
Story possessed character enough to resist Marshall, had he cared
to; but instead the two soon became firm friends and no one wor-
8WARREN, JACOBIN AND JUNTO (1931) 160.
9 QUINCY, FIGURES OF THE PAST (1884) 188.
"11 JEFFERSON, op. cit. supra note 4, 141, 153, letters of 1810. Livingston
v. Jefferson, 1 Brock. 203, Fed. Cas. No. 8,411 (D. Va. 1811).
n 1 WARREN, op. cit. supra note 7, 406.
" 1 WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL (1908) 235-238. Story
said that a "pseudo-republican was one who dared to venture a doubt upon
Mr. Jefferson's infallibility." 1 W. W. STORY, LIFE AND LETTERs OF JOSEPH
STORY (1851) 185.
See MACDONALD, SELrr DOCUMENTS (1905) 176, for the Embargo Act
of 1807. See also SEARS, JEFFERSON AND THE! EMBARGO Act (1927) ; AMES,
STATE DOCUMENTS ON FEDERAL RELATIONS (1906) 25.
"... the apparent object of Mr. Jefferson being to destroy the commercial
interests, with a view of rendering the country self-subsistent ...
"Already its results [the Embargo Act] had been disastrous to the commerce
of the sea-board States, and particularly to New England, which was then
almost wholly commercial in its enterprise ... "
1 STORY, op. cit. supra note 12, at 171. See id. at 183-187, to the effect that
Jefferson's policy was for New England to do everything and to have nothing
and that "our own interests" are sacrificed.
14 11 JEFFERSON, op. cit. supra note 4, at 1401. 1 TYLER, LIFE AND TIMES
OF THE TyiERs (1884) 186, a letter of Jefferson written in 1810.
11 JEFFERSON, op. cit. mpra note 4, 140-142.
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shipped the Chief Justice more than the young "Republican" ap-
pointee.1 6  One can hardly accuse Story of being a renegade, 17 for
despite the fact that he was appointed a member of the Supreme
Court as a "Republican," he was never an admirer of the Virginia
leaders.' 8  His choice for the bench by President Madison came
long after one appointee had declined, another had been rejected by
the Senate, and a third appointment confirmed but refused by the
appointee. His selection was due to the fact that few "Republican"
lawyers were available in New England, a section supposedly entitled
to Cushing's successor. 19
Though Story might have indulged in some youthful indiscretions
in his "Fourth of July oration," his politics was not the agrarian
states' rights philosophy of Jefferson.20 Story's views were nation-
alistic2 ' and "espoused the new gospel of capitalism, with none of.
the agrarian prejudices of the landed gentry to hold him back";21a
ideas of which Jefferson and his disciples could not be accused of
being particularly fond.
22
' 4 Bav uixE, op. cit. mpra note 6, c. 2; Moses, The Friendship Between
Marshall and Story (1901) 35 Amr. L. REv. 321. Story dedicated, in a lauda-
tory introduction, his work on constitutional law of 1833 to Marshall.
' For the attacks on Story as a renegade and the explanation of his emanci-
pation from his party and the early prejudices in favor of Mr. Jefferson's
abstractions, see 1 STORY, op. cit. supra note 12, at 277.
"For Story's attitude on states' rights, see a letter of 1819 in which he
said: "All the cobwebs of sophistry and metaphysics about State rights and
State sovereignty he [Pinkney] brushed away with a mighty besom." Id.
at 325.
"5 ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1891) 359; 11 JErsON,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 151; ORTH AND CUSHMAN, AMERICAN NATIONAL
GOVEmMENT (1931) 520. In 1801 Story said that there were not more than
five or six lawyers in Massachusetts who dared avow themselves to be "Repub-
licans." 1 STORY, op. cit. supra note 12, at 96.
SMERRIAM, AMERIcAN POLITICAL THEORIES (1924) c. 4; BEARD, EcoNomIc
ORIGINS OF JEFFERSONiAN DEMoCEAcr (1915).
For Jefferson's attitude on the importance of agriculture in the new nation, see
PARRINGTON, THE COLONIAL MIND (1927) 346-349; 6 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFERSON (Washington ed. 1854) 335.
G rETEL, HISTORY OF PoLrIcAL THOUGHT (1924) 418.
2' PARRINGTON, THE ROMANTIC REVOLUTION IN AMERICA (1800-1860)
(1927) 301.
See also 2 STORY, CONSTITUTION oF THE UNITED STATES (5th ed. 1891)
§§1057, 1058; infra note 58.
See also judge Story's views on the "citizenship" of a corporation for purposes
of diversity of citizenship: 2 STORY, op. cit. supra note 12, at 469; 2 WARREN,
op. cit. supra note 7, at 395.
214 JEFFERSON, op. cit. supra note 4, at 85.
"The Southern States are accused of a hostility to commerce; but this is by
no means true, in the extent to which we are taught to believe. . . . The
truth is that the Southern States have no hostility to commerce, as such;
they have a system of reasoning on the subject which is abstract and peculiar;
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Story's views were stated in his own language when he said:
"Nay, a Virginia republican of that day, was very different from a
Massachusetts republican.... I was avowedly a believer in the doc-
trines of Washington, and little infected with Virginia notions, as
to men or measures.
'23
After his accession to the bench in 1811, Story proved that the
Virginia dynasty never made a worse guess than when they selected
him. Jefferson's hope of republicanizing2 4 the bench by appoint-
ments from his party proved futile and it was his fears rather than
of the Federalists which were realized. The staunchest of Federal-
ists could now approve of Story, whose constitutional decisions
2 41
should take their place along with those of Marshall as nationalistic.
In fact, some of the anti-nationalists later feared Story, an alleged
"'miserably frivolous bookworm,?' even more than Marshall.25
III
Though Story came to the bench as a "Republican" his decisions
were not "infected with Virginia notions" as can be shown by two
important opinions, both prior to Swift v. Tyson, which are seldom
discussed together.
In 1813 Judge Story while on the circuit, in United States v.
Coolidge,2 6 affirmed a then current Federalist view27 that there were
Federal common law crimes.28 Story perhaps did not include all
and their opposition to it results less from dislike, than from a fear that all
other objects will be sacrificed to it." 1 STORY, op. cit. supro note 12, at 182,
a letter of 1809.
"So much for the Virginia desire to destroy commerce." Id. at 193, a
letter of 1809.
23 1 STORY, op. cit. supra note 12, at 128.
S11 JEiFRsoN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 153.
'a For these decisions see: 3 Lmvs, op. cit. supra note 7, 138-167.
2 WARuN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 179.
1 Gall. 488, Fed. Cas. No. 14,857 (D. Mass. 1813). See also 1 Wheat.
415, 4 L. ed. 124 (1816).
In Swift v. Tyson, Mr. Dana for the defendant, who opposed Story's view
in that case, discussed in his argument Story's views in the Coolidge case and
stated that the question raised in this latter case was again presented in Swift
v. Tyson, 16 Pet. at 11, 10 L. ed. at 868-9.
' See the remarks of Chairman of the Congressional Committee, to consider
the extension of the Sedition Act of 1798, who stated that the statute should
be continued as the Federal common law crime of seditious libel, which was
based on the law of England prior to the Revolution, was ameliorated by the
Sedition Act and was therefore more objectionable than the statute. ANNALS
OF 6TH CONGRESS (1799-1801) 916-917, debate of Jan. 21, 1801.
" For the history of the cases on Federal common law crimes, see: RAWLE,
CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1829) c. 29; 1 KENT, COmmENTARIES 331; 1 STORY,
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (5th ed. 1891) §158; WHARTON, STATE
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common law crimes but limited them to those against the sovereignty
of the United States and to those within the powers conferred
on the Federal government by the Constitution. This decision cer-
tainly was not in accord with the ideas of the Virginia "Repub-
licans." Madison, who appointed him to the bench, had as early
as 1800 prepared a long report to the Virginia Assembly which
denounced the idea of Federal common law crimes. 29  Later St.
George Tucker in 1803 in his edition of Blackstone had expressed
the same view,30 and Jefferson censidered the idea of any Federal
common law, criminal or civil, as but a step to accomplish a mon-
archy peaceably. 31
Even if the non-statutory crimes for which the Federal courts
could punish were to be confined solely to admiralty jurisdiction,32
which was the issue in the Coolidge case,3 3 New England maritime
commerce would have been far safer. And Story, no doubt, ex-
pressed the fears of the commercial groups when he pointed out
that depredations on foreign trade could go on with the national
government powerless to prevent them in the absence of Federal
criminal statutes or a Federal common law of crimes. 84
This decision exalted the power of the national government in
the protection of commerce and invoked the aid of the common law
for that purpose; surely these ideas were no part of the'legal philos-
TRIALS (1849) 85, n.; 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAw (10th ed. 1896) §254;
WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR (1911). For support for Story's
view in this case, see Warren, New Light on the History of the Judiciary
Act of 1789 (1923) 37 HARv. L. RFyv. 49, 73.
"4 ELLIOTT, DmATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1901) 546, 561,
"Madison's report on the Virginia resolutions of 1798-'9, exploding the com-
mon-law doctrine, and recognized as a masterpiece of logic, gave the Federal-
ists a fearful shock." 1 TYLER, op. cit. supra note 14, at 258.
o See 1 Tucxm, BLACKSTONE (1803), editor's appendix, 378, n. E. to the
effect that there is no federal common law. See 5 id. at 3, n. A, to the effect
that there are no federal common law crimes.
1a9 JEFFERSON, op. cit. supra' note 4, 87, 139.. 4 THE WRITINGS OF JEFFERSON
(Washington ed. 1854) 301.
"See LbNG, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1926) 471, n. 2, to the
effect that the only instance where Congress exercises a legislative power as a
result of jurisdiction conferred on the judiciary is in the case of admiralty.
""But the subsequent case of Coolidge did not fall within that principle,
because the offense there charged was clearly a case of admiralty jurisdiction,
and the courts of the United States would seem to have had general and
exclusive jurisdiction over the case." 1 KENT, COMMENTARIES 338; see
also 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW (10th ed. 1896) 268, n. 3.
"1 STORY, op. cit. supra note 12, 247, 297.
For the importance of a national admiralty ju(isdiction, as opposed to state
jurisdiction, in relation to trade, see FRANRFURTER AND LANDIS, THE BUSINESS
OF THE SUPREME COURT (1928) 7.
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ophy of the Virginian "Republicans." Thus in two years after his
selection, the new appointee was showing his emancipation from
early predilections, if any, to "Virginia notions."
IV
In 1816, in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,35 Story announced his
views on the nature of the judicial power of the Federal courts and
first stated his constitutional views on the relation of the states to the
Federal government.35 '
In a dictum he said of the Federal courts:
"If, then, it is a duty of Congress to vest the judicial power of the
United States, it is a duty to vest the whole judicial power .... It
would seem, therefore, to follow that Congress are bound to create
some inferior courts, in which to vest all that jurisdiction which,
under the Constitution, is exclusively vested in the United States,
and of which the Supreme Court cannot take original jurisdiction.
... But the whole judicial power of the United States should be, at
all times, vested either in an original or appellate form, in some courts
created under its authority."30
Since the dictum was historically unsound37 and not justified by
the language of the Constitution 38 it has not been followed.30 It
serves, however, to show his distinctly nationalistic attitude and his
desire to increase the power of the Federal judiciary; a desire per-
haps justified to some extent at the time because Federal jurisdiction
was confined largely to cases of diversity of citizenship and did not
include original jurisdiction over Federal questions.40
But the anti-nationalists had no such desire to expand the juris-
"1 Wheat. 304, 4 L. ed. 97 (1816).
15 1 STORY, op. cit. supra note 12, at 277. See 1 WARREN, op. cit. supra
note 7, 443, for a discussion of this case. See Warren, Federal Criminal Law
and State Courts (1924) 38 HAsv. L. REv. 545, 568, to the effect that this view
was a favorite Federalist one.
' See infra note 59.
'" Mr. Wilson and Mr. Madison said iti debates in the Federal Convention
of 1787, "that there was a distinction between establishing such tribunals
absolutely, and giving a discretion to the legislature to establish or not to
establish them." 5 ELLIOT, op. cit. supra note 29, at 159.
THE FEDERALIST (Lodge, 1888) No. 81, 511, No. 82, 516; WARREN, THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1928) 236-327. See also Brown, The Juris-
diction of Federal Courts (1929) 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 179, 180.
83Art. 111, §2.
'Kline v. Burke Const. Co., 260 U. S. 226, 43 Sup. Ct. 79, 67 L. ed. 226,
24 A. L. R. 1077 (1922); Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 19 L. ed. 264
(1869). See, however, COUNTRYMAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ITS API'PEL-
LATE PowE UNDER THE, CONSTITUTION (1911) c. 3.
'To the effect that federal questions were not within the scope of the
original jurisdiction of inferior federal courts until 1875, see FRANKFURTER
AND KATZ, op. cit. supra note 2, 734-735.
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diction of Federal courts, even within their constitutional limits, and
were willing to allow the state courts to continue to deal with Fed-
eral questions as a matter of original jurisdiction.41
Of the opinion as a whole it has been said:
"Mr. Henry Adams 42 asserts that Chief Justice Marshall achieved
one of his greatest victories by causing Justice Story, a Republican,
raised to the Bench in 1811 for the purpose of contesting his author-




Finally in 1842 in Swieft v. Tyson,44 when the court was Dem-
ocratic however,4 5 came a decision in which it was held that the Fed-
eral courts, in diversity of citizenship cases, 45" on questions of gen-
eral commercial jurisprudence46 should use their own judgment as to
what is the state law. Granting that there is no Federal common
law,47 Story seems to have intended in the field of commercial juris-
prudence to build up a body of unwritten law which did not neces-
sarily follow the law of the state whose decisions should perhaps
have governed the case.48
" Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789
(1923) 37 HARv. L. Rxv. 49, 53; OaTH AND CUSHMAN, op. cit. mpra note 19,
at 510.
"9 ADAMS, op. cit. supra note 19, at 191:
"1 CARsoN, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1902) 245.
See also BABCOCK, RISE OF AMERICAN NATIONALITY (1906) 293.
"Supra note 1.
"2 WARREN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 362.
"4 James Wilson in a debate in Pennsylvania on the adoption of the pro-
posed Federal Constitution, said that the diversity of- citizenship jurisdiction
of the federal courts was granted to prevent destroying the sources of credit
and to protect the creditor classes from tender and other laws. 2 ELLIOT, op.
cit. supra note 29 at 491.
"The phrase "general law" has been used in later cases instead of the
more restricted one, "commercial jurisprudence." (1928) 77 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 105, 108, n. 23.
This article assumes that the original scope of Swift v. Tyson was confined
to "the general principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence."
For an extension of "the assumed dominion into new fields" see Black &
White Taxi Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxi Co., 276 U. S. 518, 48 Sup. Ct. 404
72 L. ed. 681 (1928).
" "Swift v. Tyson created for commercial cases a common law of the
United States. Before that, the existence of such a thing had often been
denied." Rand, Swift V. Tyson versus Gelpcke v. Dubuque (1894) 8 HARv.
L. REv. 328, 343. See also the argument of Mr. Dana for the defendant in
Swift v. Tyson that there is no federal common law. 16 Pet. 1, 11, 10 L. ed.
at 868-9; supra note 26.
3While RAwLE, op. cit. supra note 28, at 254, argued that there were
federal common law crimes he stated that "the term, laws of the several
states," appearing in §34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, embraced the common
law as well as statutes. See also Warren, supra note 41, at 81, for a dis-
cussion of the original draft of the Judiciary Act of 1789.
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Such a decision as this Jefferson would have resented. 49 He had
an early aversion to merchants and commerce,50 a later dislike for
the Federal judiciary,5' and a still later distaste for Judge Story.6
2
Admitting that Swift v. Tyson has produced no harmful results, the
states' rights group and agrarian followers of Jefferson could not
have, if they had but thought about it, approved this decision. Clearly
here was a chance to build up a national body of commercial law, in
a field in which Congress had no power to legislate,58 and by a body
of men over which the people of the states had no legislative con-
trol.54 No more anti-Jeffersonian scheme could be imagined than
this,-of non-elective Federal judges formulating commercial law
and ignoring state decisions. Today such a decision by a Federal
court might not seem unusual but in the earlier days of the republic,
when antagonism to the Federal judiciary was at times strong and
the state courts perhaps more jealous, such an opinion was obviously
a markedly nationalistic one.55
Some may consider Story's decision in Swidft v. Tyson no more
than an expression of his desire to build up a uniform body " of
"9 THE WRITINGS OF JEFFERSON (Washington ed. 1854) 486, ihcludes a
notation of 1812 which also interprets §34 of .the Judiciary Att of 1789 as
including common law as well as statutes. See also 9 JEFFEmsON op. cit. supra
note 4, at 73, for Jefferson's prediction of the effect of a federal common law
on state courts.
'For Jefferson's dislike of merchants see 6 THE WRITINGS OF JEFFERSON
(Washington ed. 1854) 335, a letter of 1814, wherein he said: "Merchants
have no country." 3 BEVERIDGE, op. cit. supra note 6, c. 2. Supra note 20.
" In a letter of 1820 Jefferson referred to the federal judiciary as "the
subtle corps of sappers and miners." 12 JEmFERsoN, op. cit. supra note 4,
at 177.
'Supra notes 4 and 11.
"DoBIE, FEDERAL PRocEDuRE (1928) 573.
"See Fordham, The Federal Courts and the Construction of Uniform State
Laws (1929) 7 N. C. L. REv. 423, to the effect that even since the adoption of
the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act -the federal courts have not always
followed state interpretations of the act. See also: State Statutes as Rule
of Decision in Federal Courts (1926) 5 TEx. L. REv. 191.
"For an attack on the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson because it affects the
independence of the state judiciary, see Justice Field's dissenting opinion in
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 401; 13 Sup. Ct. 914,
927; 37 L. ed. 772, 786 (1892).
"Swift v'. Tyson is depriving them [the states] of their greatest attribute-
the right to administer justice." Shelton, Concurrent Jurisdiction (1928) 15
VA. L. REv. 137, 144.
See article six of the impeachment charges against Judge Samuel Chase in
1804 where he was charged with ignoring §34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789
in a criminal case. ANNALS OF 8TH CONGaSS, 2n SESsIoN (1804-1805) 730.
KONKLE, JOSEPH HopEiNsoN (1931) 99, states generally that Chase was
charged with preferring a national body of law to state laws.
" "The argument of the court in Swift '. Tyson presupposes the existence
of a uniform body of commercial law throughout the civilized world, and
stresses the importance of having.the federal courts exert their influence upon
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commercial law-to be enforced in the Federal courts. But clearly its
effect was to confer on the Federal courts, by judicial legislation,
control over commercial transactions in diversity of citizenship cases
and thus greatly to widen the scope of the jurisdiction of the na-
tional courts.
Story perhaps had just cause for his desire to build a national
body of commercial law, uniform throughout the growing nation and
as free as possible from the control of the state. The Supreme
Court's experience with the early state tender, insolvency and stay
laws had taught it that legislatures were likely to favor the debtor
class. 56 And just as Jefferson considered the bulwark of an inde-
pendent nation to be the rural interests, 57 so Story placed great faith
in commerce as the basis of a stable nation.58
Story also had feared about 1812 the dissolution of the Union
because of the disaffection of commercial interests in New England.
While it is customary among some to consider thfat Marshall was
waging a battle to build a national government against the disintegrat-
ing influences of the Virginia "Republicans," Story had been equally
afraid of dissatisfaction in New England. 59  He knew of the Fed-
eralist leaders there who perhaps wished to secede because of the
economic effect of the anti-commercial attitude of the Virginia
"Republicans."6o
the state courts to maintain this uniformity." State Decisions as Precedents
in Federal Cases Arising by Reason of Diversity of Citizenship (1928) 77 U.
oF PA. L. Rxv. 105, 108. See also 2 WARREN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 363. On
the idea of uniformity in commercial law in relation to Swift v. Tyson see
(1928) 77 U. OF PA. L. Rzv. 105, n. 5; 109, n. 28.
" Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 253 (1825). 2 WARRmN,
op. cit. supra note 7, 107-111; (1928) 77 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 105, n. 4; (1923)
37 HARv. L. REv. 49, 82. Infra note 66. See also 1 STORY, op. Cit. supra
note 12, at 331. a letter of 1819 to Chancellor Kent.
' 4 JEFFERSON, op. cit. supra note 4, at 85. Supra note 20.
'For Story's ideas on commerce in relation to the federal government, see
STORY, Misc. WRITINGS (1835) 187. See also supra note 21a.
' WARREN, op. cit. supra note 7, 453.
"I am sorry to perceive the spirit of disaffection in Massachusetts increasing to
so high a degree; and, I fear that it is stimulated by a desire, in a very few
ambitious men, to dissolve the Union. . . . I should deplore as the greatest
possible calamity, the separation of the states." 1 STORY, op. cit. supra
note 12, at 182, a letter of 1809.
"I think the Junto are beginning to lower- their tone. A division of the
states has been meditated. ... Pray induce Congress to .give Judicial Courts
of the United States power to punish all crimes and offenses against the Govern-
ment as at common law. Do not suffer conspiracies to destroy the Union to be
formed in the bosom of the country, and yet no laws exist to punish them."
Id. at 243, a letter of 1812.
00 See MAcDONALD, op. cit. supra note 13, at 200, for the report of the
Hartford Convention of f815, where the "Republicans" were charged with "a
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While these events occurred many years before the decision of
Swift v. Tyson in 1842, and can be said to have had no effect on
Story's judicial opinions, it must be recalled Story was tenacious in
his ideas and doggedly tried to achieve them either by congressional
legislation or by judicial decisions. In 1816 we find Story drafting a
bill enacting his dictum in Martin v. Hunters Lessee, about which he
said:
"The object of this section is to give to the Circuit Court original
jurisdiction of all cases intended by the Constitution to be confided
to the judicial power of the United States, where that jurisdiction
has not been already delegated by law. If it was proper in the Con-
stitution to provide for such a jurisdiction, it is wholly irreconcilable
with the sound policy or interests of the Government to suffer it to
slumber. Nothing can better tend to promote the harmony of the
States, and cement the Union (already too feebly supported) than an
exercise of all the powers legitimately confided to the General Gov-
ernment, and the judicial power is that which must always form a
strong and stringent link." 1
And similarly in the field of Federal criminal law Story long con-
tinued to point out the necessity of additional criminal legislation
and to recommend that common law power of a limited nature over
crimes be conferred on the Federal courts.
62
While by 1842 the New England dissatisfaction had long ceased,
and all fear of disunion there was over, Story perhaps had not for-
gotten the lessons of his younger days and the need of the commercial
class for protection at the hands of the Federal courts.0 3 Here in
visionary and superficial theory in regard to commerce, accompanied by a real
hatred but feigned regard to its interests."
I A comment prepared by Judge Story to serve as a basis of a speech to be
made by a friend in Congress. 1 SToRY, op. cit. supra note 12, at 293; FRANK-
FURTER AND LANDIS, op. cit. supra note 34, at 36. See also 2 STORy, op. cit.
supra note 21a, §1590, for a defense in 1833 of the dictum in Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee.
' As late as 1842 Judge Story was still attempting to persuade Congress to
enact legislation to grant jurisdiction over common law crimes within the
admiralty jurisdiction.
Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and State Courts (1924) 38 HARV. L. R-V.
545, 573, n. 63. See also 1 SToRY, op. cit. mupra note 12, 315, 440. 2 id.
373, 402.
Judge Story expressed as early as 1813 in Van Reimsdyk v. Kane, 1 Gall.
630, Fed. Cas. No. 16,872 (D. R. I.) the same view that he expressed in
Swift v. Tyson in 1842.
'In speaking of certain constitutional decisions of Marshall it has been
said: "They settled the sacred inviolability of contracts, the stability of insti-
tutions and, last but most important, nationalism." KoNC.E, op. cit. supra
note 55, at 216. See also ORTH AND CUSHMAN, Op. cit. supra note 19, 562-3.
Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law (1914) 12 Mica.
L. Rxv. 247, 276.
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Swift v. Tyson was an opportunity to secure a uniform national com-
mercial law and once again give to commerce the conservative support
of a stable judidiary.
64
Thus when an issue as to whether state decisions should govern
suits in the Federal courts in diversity of citizenship cases arose,65
involving an important but controversial point of the law merchant,
Story was able to achieve another judicial victory for the Federal
courts over the state judiciary.
By Swift v. Tyson a uniform body of commercial law to be form-
ulated by the Federal judiciary was apparently6 5* assured to the busi-
ness class in diversity of citizenship cases. It was this same court
which years before had secured creditors immunity from the radical
legislation designed to protect debtors from the execution of judg-
ments.66 Now the doctrine of Bay v. Coddington,67 harmful perhaps
to commerce,6 8 was to receive a blow from the Supreme Court of
the United States.6 9
To the effect that the purpose of federal jurisdiction in diversity of citizen-
ship cases was to furnish "the sense of security necessary for commercial inter-
course," see FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, Op. cit. supra note 34, at 8.
See (1928) 77 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 105, 106, n. 11; BuRaicic, THE A~mEICAN
CONSTITUTION (1922) 113; STORY, Op. cit. supra note 21a, §1795, n. 1 (b);
and 28 U. S. C. A. §725, for the cases prior to Swift v. Tyson on this same
issue. For an interesting argument by Daniel Webster in 1841 see Groves v.
Slaughter, 15 Pet. 449, 490, 10 L. ed. 800, 815 (1841), where he said: "Now,
it is contended, that when a citizen of Virginia sues in a court of the United
States, he is to be bound by the decisions of the State tribunals. This defeats
the provision in the Constitution of the United States. It is a mockery, if
this is to be the law." See infra note 84.
11 For the actual influence of Swift v. Tyson in securing uniformity, how-
ever, see Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States
and State Courts (1928) 13 CORN. L. Q. 499, 529, n. 150. See also Cole v.
Penn. R. Co., 43 F. (2d) 953, 956 (C. C. A. 2d. 1930).
Yntema and Jaffin, Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction (1931) 79
U. OF PA. L. Ray. 868, 881, n. 23.
"For discussion of the effect of creation of federal courts on state tender
laws, see Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction (1927) 41
HARv. L. Rv. 483, 491, 495. Supra note 56.
5 Johns. Ch. 54 (N. Y. 1821) ; 20 Johns. 637 (N. Y. 1822).
68 "It is for the benefit and convenience of the commercial world to give as
wide an extent as practicable to the credit and circulation of negotiable paper.
- The doctrine [of Bay v. Coddington] would strike a fatal blow at
all discounts of negotiable securities for preexisting debts." Swift v. Tyson,
16 Pet. at 20, 10 L. ed. at 872.
See, however, to the effect that commercial policy did not require the pro-
tection of the holder of the note in Bay v. Coddington: 3 KENT, COMMEN-
TARIEs, 81, and Kent's opinion in 5 Johns. Ch. 54, 58 (N. Y. 1821).
"DIL ON, LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE (1895) 246; BLACK, JUDICIAL PRECE-
DENTS (1912) §§112, 188.
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VI
In discussing Swift v. Tyson as a nationalistic decision, promot-
ing uniformity in commercial law, some reference should be made to
the status of the law merchant in 1842. It must be recalled that
barely sixty years had passed since Lord Mansfield had reduced the
law merchant "to rational and solid principles."70  This law mer-
chant was looked upon as a branch of the law of nations, 7 1 to be en-
forced in suits "between citizens of the same state and also citizens
of different states" and nations.
72
Clearly the law merchant was not considered as a body of "local"
law72a varying in different states. As Judge Story said in Swift v.
Tyson: "the law respecting negotiable instruments may be truly de-
clared in the language of Cicero, adopted by Lord Mansfield, to be
in a great measure not the law of a single country only but of the
commercial world."
73
As Mr. Fessenden in his argument for the plaintiff also said be-
fore the court in Swift v. Tyson:
"If there is any question of law, not local, but widely general in its
nature and effects, it is the present question. It is one in which for-
eigners, the citizens of different states, in their contests with each
other, nay, every nation of the civilized commercial world, are deeply
interested. . . .But it will be impossible for Congress to regulate
commerce between the States, if it be left to State courts to declare
authoritatively in the absence of any statute upon the point, the
force, and meaning of, and the right of parties under that most im-
portant instrument of such commerce-the bill of exchange when
drawn and held in and by a citizen of one State, and accepted and
payable in and by a citizen of another State." 4
Story no doubt did not consider the law merchant, when involved
in suits between citizens of different states or of the same state, as a
matter of "local" law. This being true, it would seem inevitable
" 1 WORKS OF JAMES WILsoN (1804) 375; 2 STORY, op. cit. supra note 12,
at 14. 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLo-AmBRcAN LEGAL HISTRY (1909) 1, 13;
POUND AND PLUCxNEI-, READINGS ON THE HISTORY OF THE COoihioN LAW
(1927) 223.
'a4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 66; 1 WILSON, op. cit. supra note 70;
WOODDESSON, JURISPRUDENCE (1792) lxxix.
I 1 WILSON, op. cit. supra note 70.
72 DoBrz, op. cit. supra note 53, at 572.
16 Pet. at 19, 10 L. ed. at 871. The original language which Story pur-
ports to quote from Minsfield reads: "the maritime law is not the law of a
particular country, but the general law of nations." Luke v. Lyde, 2 Burr.
882, 887 (K. B. 1759). BALDWIN, THE AMERICAN JUDICIARY (1900) 169.
"' 16 Pet at 8, 10 L. ed. at 867.
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that in commercial questions appearing before the Supreme Court,
Story should feel free to follow the illustrious Mansfield, 75 of whom
he had said that he had built up in England "a system of commercial
law of great beauty and equity."76 Thus it would be natural to ig-
nore the "local" law of the states to attempt to develop in the United
States a national commercial law.77
This idea of national uniformity in commercial law was current
at that time. In an Ohio opinion in 1846, only four years after the
decision of Swift v. Tyson, the court said:
"[The rule] is, as we conceive, a rule of sound policy, tending to
secure confidence in commercial transactions, and one that should
not, for slight causes, be departed from. Rules governing commer-
cial transactions should remain settled and uniform among a people
so much inclined and so often compelled to engage in traffic and to
deal in bills of exchange as are the people of the United States.
Notwithstanding the old rule of Lord Mansfield has been disregarded
in some of the state courts .... it has been steadily adhered to by
the Supreme Court of the United States. It is a rule of commercial
law, is incorporated into the system, and affects alike all parts of the
Union ... and the doctrine established by the United States court
should be binding throughout the Union upon such a question. The
state courts ought to follow- it, because it is founded in reison, and
for the sake of uniformity."7 8
'Jefferson entertained the same ideas of Mansfield's legal training as he
did of Story's. 11 JErimsoN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 151.
See a letter of John Quincy Adams to Story, in reply to Story's praise of
Mansfield, in 1829 to the effect that Mansfield from "radical sources en-
grafted his body of Commercial Jurisprudence upon the stock of the Common
Law of England,-a law almost entirely agricultural." 2 STORY, op. cit. supra
note 12, 19, 20. In another letter of the same year, Adams stated to Story
that Mansfield had introduced unfortunate principles "into his system of Com-
mercial Law, an fly-blow into the Common Law." Id. at 12.
" 2 SToRY, op. cit. supra note 70.
Carpenter v. Insurance Co., 16 Pet. 495, 511, 10 L. ed. 1044, 1051 (1842).
See also Watson v. Tarpley, 18 How. 517, 521, 15 L. ed. 509 (1856).
" Treon y. Brown and Fuller, 14 Ohio 482, 487 (1846). "On a question
of commercial law, however, it is desirable that there should be, as far as
practicable, uniformity of decision, not only between the courts of the several
states and of the U. S., but also between our courts and those of England. .. "
Stalker v. M'Donald, 6 Hill 93, 95 (N. Y. 1843). BLACK, op. cit. supra note
69, at 371.
"It is believed that the law, as thus settled by the highest judicial, tribunal in
the country, will become the uniform law of all, as it is now of most of the
states. And, in a country like ours, where so much communication and inter-
change exists between the different members of the confederacy, to preserve
uniformity in the great principles of commercial law, is of much interest
to the commercial world." Carlisle v. Wishart, 11 Ohio 172, 191 (1842).
See 2 Warren, op. cit. supra note 7, at 363, n. 1, citing an excerpt from a
current law journal expressing a desire for federal statutes on negotiable
paper and insurance to promote a uniform commercial law on these two sub-
jects. It was suggested that Judge Story draft the bills.
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VII
Nathan Dane, who established the chair at the Harvard Law
School which Story occupied from 1829 to 1845,79 perhaps influenced
Story's views on uniformity. Dane in 1823 had said:
"Our true course is plain; that is, by degrees, to make our laws more
uniform and natural, especially when there is nothing to make them
otherwise but local feelings and prejudices. We have, in the com-
mon and federal law, the materials of national uniformity in many
cases. We have a national judiciary promoting this uniformity....
We only want a general efficient plan supported with energy and na-
.tional feelings."80
In a review of Dane's Abridgmentt in 1826 Story quoted with
approval this excerpt from the introduction to the work:
".... A great republic ... is the natural field of law and equity; but
to produce these in perfection, there must be a national character.
The rules of law and equity, in important matters, must be uniform,
and pervade the whole nation."81
Dane, strongly Federalist in his views, in establishing d profes-
sorship in the Harvard Law School, desired that "national law" be
taught as opposed to the "law of the jurisdiction." Story, the new
professor, was to teach law "equally in force in all branches of our
Federal Republic" and ignore the law in use and in force in a single
state only.8 2 This Federalist point of view in law teaching, which
marks the beginning of our "national law schools," no doubt influ-
enced Story's views on a general American common law.8 3
Therefore, in Swift v. Tyson, it was not difficult for Judge Story,
long a professor in "a national law school" and a text-writer of na-
tional law books,84 particularly since the law of negotiable instru-
ments was in issue, to base his decision on "general principles of
commercial jurisprudence" instead of "local" law.
VIII
Thus the decision of Swift v. Tyson, when rendered, was an at-
tempt to promote national uniformity in commercial law and also a
"2 Story, op. cit. supra note 12, 1-9.
s Cited in I WORKS OF JAMES WI.soN (Andrews ed. 1895) 335, n. 3.
"STORY, op. cit. supra note 58, at 343; DANE, AB DGmENT (1823) 14.
REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAw (1921) 143,
292. See also 1 WARREN, op. cit. supra note 12, at 419.
' CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAw SCHOOL (1918) 68-69.
"See Pound, Judge Story in the Making of American Law (1916) 1 MAss.
L. Q. 121, 135, for the influence of Story as a text-writer in developing a
general common law in the United States.
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means of giving broad powers to the Federal judiciary in dealing
with commercial transactions; a power certainly not expressly con-
ferred by the Federal Constitution on the Federal government. The
principle of Swift v. Tyson,8 5 unlike that of United States v: Cool-
idge8 6 and the dictum in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,8 7 has persisted
and should be considered as nationalistic as Marshall's decisions on
the relation of the states to the Federal government."8
An excerpt from a discussion of another subject seems applicable
to Swift v. Tyson. It reads:
"Under the leadership of such men as Chief Justice Marshall, Justice
Joseph Story, and Daniel Webster,8 9 it came to be an accepted view
that nationalist, conservative, and commercialist views of American
law and politics were looked upon as sound statesmanship and oppo-




'Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 3 L. ed. 162 (1810); M'Culloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed. 579 (1819) ; Osborn v. Bank of the United
States, 9 Wheat. 738, 6 L. ed. 204 (1824). 5 CHANNING, A HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES (1921) 309; MACDONALD, JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY (1906)
248; HOCKE=r, HISTORY OF UNITED STATES (1927) 341; CoRwIN, MARSHALL
AND THE CONSTITUTION (1919) c. 5.
" For the friendly relations between Story and Webster see: 2 FuEss,
WEBSTER (1930) 455; LODGE, WEBSTER (1884) 138-139.
' HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CoNcEPTs (1930) 196.. See
also Haines, Histories of the Supreme Court From the Federalist Point of
View (1923) 4 S. W. POL. Sci. Q. 1, 22.
